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Article 7

Comment

Estate and Gift Tax Valuation:
Discounts of Partnership Interests
I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, the corporation has been the preferred entity
used by estate specialists in the planning and management of
ongoing business interests. 1 It has had the advantages of familiarity and the assurances afforded it by a recognized body of legal
3
authority.2 The corporate entity, especially the close corporate
4
variety, has almost exclusively possessed an additional feature
which warranted yielding the burdens of corporate formalities and
the corporate feature of double taxation.5 Because of the nature of
the close corporation, 6 courts were willing to discount 7 the determined value, in calculating fair market value 8 for federal estate tax
1. See Kelley, The Farm Corporationas an Estate PlanningDevice, 54 NEB. L.
REv. 217, 235 (1975); Comment, Limited Partnerships:Estate Planning Vehicle for the Family Farm, 59 NEB. L. REV. 55, 56 (1980).
2. Comment, supra note 1, at 56.
3. "Closely held corporations are those corporations the shares of which are
owned by a relatively limited number of stockholders. Often the entire stock
issue is held by one family. The result of this situation is that little, if any,
trading in the shares takes place." Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237.
4. There are a variety of cases that allow similar discounts with respect to undivided interests in real property. See, e.g., Murphy v. Granquist, 48 A.F.T.R.
1974, 1975-76 (D. Or. 1954); Estate of Clarence S. Herter, 23 T.C.M. (P-H) 1371,
372 (1954) (15% discount allowed); Campanari v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 488,
492 (1945); Estate of James C. Gregory, 9 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 132, 135 (1940).
5. Profits of the corporate entity are subject to tax at the corporate level under
I.R.C. § 11. If the profits are then distributed to the shareholders as dividends, they are taxed as income under I.R.C. § 61. See Eastwood, The Farm
Corporationfrom an Income Tax Viewpoint: Friendor Foe?, 54 NEB. L. REV.
443, 444-45 (1975). For a more complete discussion of the advantages of operation of a business entity in the corporate form, see id; Kelley, supra note 1.
6. See note 3 supra. See also § IV of text infra.
7. See § IV of text infra. See generally Greenwald, Pricing the Stock of a
Closely-Held Corporationfor FederalEstate Taxation (pts. 1 and 2), 46 N.Y.
ST. B.J. 421, 535 (1974); Jensen, Stock Valuation Formulasfor Estate and Gift
Taxes, 117 TR. & EST. 238 (1978); Maher, Discountsfor Lack of Marketability
for Closely Held Business Interests,54 TAXES 562 (1976); Comment, Valuation
of Shares in a Closely Held Corporation,47 Miss. L.J. 715 (1976).
8. I.R.C. § 2031 requires that the amount of all real or personal property, tangible
or intangible, valued as of the date of a decedent's death, be included in a
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valuation purposes. Since the inception of the discounted valuation principle, 9 the Internal Revenue Service (Service) has argued
for lower discounts and higher valuations, 10 but has never seriously contested the validity of the discount principle." It has become a recognized and accepted part of the valuation process for
close corporation stock in the determination of estate tax gross estate valuation.
Despite the substantial valuation bonus, the discount principle
inherent in close corporations has given the estates of affected
stockholders, 12 the corporation has been losing some of the glamour it held for estate planners. 13 Estate planners are beginning to
appreciate the flexibility of the partnership as an estate planning
15
entity. 14 Notwithstanding the partnership's tax complexity, its

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.
14.
15.

decedent's gross estate. This includes the value of stock in a close corporation despite the difficulties attending the placement of a fair market value on
close corporate stock.
See Estate of Irene de Guebriant, 14 T.C. 611, 619-20 (1950); Mathilde B.
Hooper v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 114, 129 (1940); Hanscom v. Commissioner,
24 B.T.A. 173, 175 (1930) (denying a discount from net asset value for lack of
evidence but impliedly accepting the principle); Andrew B.C. Dohrmann v.
Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 507, 515-517 (1930). For a complete summary of the
major discount cases, see Moroney, Most Courts Overvalue Closely Held
Stock, 51 TAXES 144 (1973).
See generally Central Trust Co. v. United States, 305 F.2d 393 (Ct. Cl. 1962)
(allowing a 12.17% discount where the issue was whether a straight discount
or a weighted average discount method should be applied); Bader v. United
States, 172 F. Supp. 833, 836 (S.D. Ill. 1959) (allowing a 10% discount for nonmarketability where the issue was basically one of amount of discount); Englebrecht & Davison, A StatisticalLook at Tax Court Compromise in Estate
and Gift Tax Valuation of Closely Held Stock, 55 TAXES 395, 400 (1977) (asserting that the Tax Court is not concerned with the validity of the discount
argument, but instead acts as an arbitrator between the taxpayer's and the
Service's asserted amounts of discount).
See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 238-42. This revenue ruling mentions a
number of factors that would justify a discount, such as a non-controlling interest, a low dividend paying capacity of the entity, a poor financial condition
in terms of the asset-liability ratio, and a loss of key management personnel.
The discounts given can range anywhere from 10%, Bader v. United States,
172 F. Supp. 833, 838 (S.D. Ill. 1959), to 60% and upwards, Whittemore v. Fitzpatrick, 127 F. Supp. 710, 722 (D. Conn. 1954) (allowing a 66% discount for
each of three separate gifts of stock constituting minority, noncontrolling interests).
Comment, supra note 1, at 57. See also Abbin, The Partnership Capital
Freeze-An Alternative to Corporate Recapitalization, 13 U. MIAMI EST.
PLAN. INST. T 1800.2 (1979).
Nash, Family Partnerships:A Viable PlanningAlternative, 13 U. MIAMI EST.
PLAN. INST. 1 1000, 1003 (1979); Comment, supra note 1, at 57.
"[T]he taxation of partners and partnerships is among the most difficult,
complex and frustrating branches of the tax law." Zeitlin, Foreword in 1 W.
MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHrrMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND
PARTNERS v. (1977) [hereinafter MCKEE].
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popularity for estate planning purposes is growing. Prior to 1977,
however, there was only remote hope for the practitioner who
sought a valuation discount for a partnership interest for estate tax
valuation purposes. 16 The Service took the position in valuing
partnership interests under section 2031 of the Internal Revenue
Code (Code) that, for example, a seventy percent interest in a
partnership at death was worth seventy percent of the value of the
net assets of the partnership. 17 This position, referred to as the
"asset valuation rule," viewed the partnership as an aggregate of
rights in the partnership property which were held individually by
the partners, and not as an entity 8 or as an interest in an ongoing
business similar to a corporation. Clearly a discount for a minority
interest or lack of marketability is inconsistent with this characterization of a partnership. The practitioner was faced with an economic dilemma: using the corporate entity with all its drawbacks
and thereby retaining the advantage of the discount factor or opting for the partnership entity with its flexibility and thereby losing
the substantial benefit of valuing the interest at a discount for estate tax purposes.
The judicial inroads into the asset valuation rule occurred in
1977, when two courts found the discount principle applicable to
partnership interests. 19 The holdings in Estate of Goldie Brown v.
Commissioner20 and Estate of Bischoff v. Commissioner2' initiated
the use of the discount principle in the estate tax valuation of part16. In 1977, two cases, Estate of Goldie Brown, 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 377 (1977), and
Estate of Bruno Bischoff v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 32 (1977), allowed discounts for estate tax purposes for partnership interests. See § In of text infra.
17. For a more complete discussion of the Service position in valuing partnership
interests, see § II of text infra.
18.
Subchapter K represents a blending of two views as to the nature of
partnerships. The first view is that a partnership is simply an aggregation of individuals, each of whom should be treated as the owner of
a direct undivided interest in partnership assets and operations. The
second view is that a partnership is a separate entity, apart from the
partners. Under this view, a partner has no direct interest in partnership assets or operations, only an interest in the partnership entity
separate and apart from its assets and operations.
1 McKEE, supra note 15, 1.02 [1]. Treatment of the partnership as an entity
would be analagous to the Service's treatment of corporations. For a good
discussion of the entity and aggregate confusion in the partnership tax area,
see Fellows, PartnershipTaxation: Confusion in Section 702(b), 32 TEx. L.
REv. 67 (1976).
19. This development should not be considered a "breakthrough" in the discounted valuation area, since in the Bischoff case, the Service actually conceded the validity of the discount, questioning only the amount of the
discount. 69 T.C. 32, 49 (1977).
20. 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 377, 381, 381 n.3 (1977).
21. 69 T.C. 32, 49 (1977).
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nership interests. Nevertheless, the practitioner who expected the
floodgates to open with partnership discounts similar to the historically recognized close corporation discounts has to date been disappointed. 22 Even in the wake of these decisions,
the Service has
23
clung tenanciously to the asset valuation rule.
This comment will analyze the Service's position on partnership estate tax valuation and will consider the nature and effect of
judicial inroads into the asset valuation rule. The partnership
model will be compared to the close corporation in order to determine whether, and when, the same discount factors applicable and
accepted by the courts in the corporate cases logically can be applied to general and limited partnership interests. 24 An argument
will be developed to ease the "all or nothing" dilemma of choice
estate planners face with respect to valuation discounts when they
choose between the corporate and partnership entities. The
choice of the form of the entity then can be based on other more
relevant factors affecting the ongoing enterprise.
II. THE SERVICE POSITION ON PARTNERSHIP
VALUATION
A.

The Asset Valuation Rule

In order for the practitioner to fully understand the nature of
the changes that the recent Tax Court cases 25 have signaled, it is
necessary to detail the past and present position of the Service in
partnership valuation cases. The scope of this comment is limited
to considerations relevant to estate and gift tax valuations, and although their respective considerations often overlap or are similar,
there arise certain instances when the distinctive nature of the
transaction may effect a different result.26 Where that is likely to
occur, this comment will specifically delineate the distinction;
otherwise, for all practical purposes, the estate and gift tax valuation concepts are similar.
22. This author found no decisions subsequent to the 1977 decisions permitting
discounting in the partnership setting.
23. See Cutbirth v. United States, 38 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 6271, 6274 (N.D. Tex. 1976)
(valuing a 402 acre rice allotment-the sole partnership asset-as a separate
asset subject to separate valuation).
24. The Uniform Partnership Act [hereinafter cited as UPA] has been adopted
by Nebraska and is codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 67-301 to -343 (Reissue
1976). The Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1916) [hereinafter cited as
ULPA] has been adopted by Nebraska and is codified at NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 67-201 to -232 (Reissue 1976).
25. See notes 19-22 & accompanying text supra.
26. For instance, a special discount valuation may be allowed in a gifting situation in which the donor is a key man, or in which the nature of the business
as an ongoing entity is adversely affected by the gift of the interest.
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1. Estate Tax and the Asset Valuation Rule
The clearest example of the operation of the asset valuation
rule may be found in Estate of Pitts v. Commissioner. 7 In Pitts,
the court was called upon to determine the value of a 321/ % interest in each of two construction partnerships.28 The court held that
the value to be included in the estate was a 32%% interest in the
value of the inventory of machinery and equipment, plus a like
29
proportion of other items on hand valued at fair market value.
There was no discussion of the value of the partnership as an ongoing entity,3 0 and no consideration was given to any "bundle of
rights" that a 32'/2% interest in the partnership might possess. 31
The position of the Service, simply stated, is that the value of a
decedent's partnership interest at the time of his death is "the fair
market value of the net partnership assets at the time of his death
.... -"2 The asset valuation rule has the advantages of simplicity
27. 19 B.T.A. 288 (1930).
28. Id. at 289.
29. Id. at 293. The fact that the interest in the partnerships held by the estate
was sold shortly after the decedent's death provided a complete inventory of
all of the specific partnership-owned assets. Id. at 290-91. There was no question that the inventory or the agreed upon price for the 32 1 % interest was a
fair assessment of the value at death of the interest. Id. at 290. For a definition of the term "gross estate," see I.R.C. § 2031.
30. It was clear in this case, where the surviving partner purchased the decedent's interest, that the business itself would continue to operate as it had
before. Yet the taxpayer did not present any argument as to the value of the
partnership as an entity, perhaps because the sale price had fixed the interest at a reasonably low price, even under the asset valuation method. See id.
at 292-93.
31. In George Edward Quick Trust, 54 T.C. 1336 (1970), acq. affd per curiam, 444
F.2d 80 (8th Cir. 1971), the court, considering the valuation of a partnership
entity for estate tax purposes, characterized the interest as a "bundle of
rights" in the partnership. However, the rights considered were rights in individual items of partnership assets, not in the rights inherent in the partnership interest. 54 T.C. at 1345. The "bundle of rights" that are considered here
in the partnership are analogous to the rights a shareholder has in a corporation.
32. Fiorito v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 440, 447 (1959). See Estate of Cutbirth v.
United States, 38 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 6271, 6274 (N.D. Tex.1976); Estate of Arthur J. Brandt, 18 T.C.M. (P-H) 720, 729 (1949); Estate of Philip Sugarman v.
Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 960, 963-64 (1930); McColgan v. Commissioner, 10
B.T.A. 958, 960 (1928). See also Estate of Bischoff v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 32
(1977) (the Service argued that since the partnerships were engaged in the
real estate business and were holding real estate, the partnership interest
should be valued at the respective fractional interest the partnership would
bear to a fractional interest value in the real estate. Id. at 48-49. This argument is akin to the asset valuation rule, though not exactly the same.); Rev.
Rul. 68-154, 1968-1 C.B. 395 (the Service ruled that partnership assets "form no
part of the deceased partner's estate. However, at his death, the right to
share in the net partnership assets passes to his estate. To measure that
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and ease of administration, but it lacks integrity in cases in which
a fair valuation of the interest transferred is sought. If the partnership terminates for both state law 33 and tax purposes 34 at the
death of a partner, and the partnership agreement calls for a distribution of the assets in the same percentage as the ownership of
partnership interests, 35 then perhaps the asset valuation rule has
some credibility.
However, in a number of situations, the partnership does not
36
is
terminate for tax purposes and the partnership agreement
drafted so that the partnership may continue, with either the estate, an heir, or one of the original partners taking the deceased
partner's place in the partnership. It is particularly in such cases
that the Service's asset valuation rule does not present a fair legal

33.

34.

35.
36.

right or interest, upon which the [estate] tax is based, the value of the partnership assets are properly taken into consideration." Id. at 396).
Certain contingencies must exist before the death of a partner will cause termination under state law. If the partner who died was the sole general partner of a limited partnership, his death will dissolve the partnership. NEB.
Rav. STAT. § 67-220 (Reissue 1976). In a general partnership, if it is not contrary to the partnership agreement, dissolution (as defined by id. § 67-329)
will occur on the death of any partner. Id. § 67-331.
I.R.C. § 708(b) provides two situations in which a partnership will terminate
for tax purposes: if
(A) [N]o part of any business, financial operation, or venture of
the partnership continues to be carried on by any of its partners in a
partnership, or
(B) within a 12-month period there is a sale or exchange of 50
percent or more of the total interest in partnership capital and profits,
the partnership shall be considered as terminated.
This does not generally mean that the partnership terminates on the
death of a partner, because death does not satisfy either of the above requirements of termination. However, the death of a partner may indirectly trigger
termination if, as a result of death, the partnership's business ceases and the
partnership assets are distributed to the partners. 1 McKEE, supra note 15, 1
12.04[11]. Also, a termination for tax purposes does not necessarily mean that
the entity's business has ceased; the result of tax termination is basically that
the partnership's books must be closed for that taxable year, and the consequent basis adjustments, elections and constructive distribution and recontribution of assets to the continuing partnership will occur. Id. 1 12.05 [2].
A distribution agreement which provides for distribution of the assets in proportion to the partner's partnership interests generally is concerned with the
partner's capital, not profit interest. 1 McKEE, supra note 15, T 3.02[5].
One problem with a discussion of the possible occurrences on the death of a
partner lies with the inherent flexibility the law accords partnerships. The
agreements, basically contracts between the partners, can be drafted to suit
the specific needs of the partners. In recognizing that problem, the reader is
advised to examine carefully any partnership agreement before attempting to
analyze the effects of the death of a partner in any particular partnership. See
generally Nash, supra note 14, %T1000, 1003.
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or economic assessment of valuation. 37 Clearly, when the interest

in the partnership business is transferred at death and the entity
does not cease business operations and distribute the net assets,
something more than the pro rata interest in those assets has been
transferred. Among the non-asset rights and duties in the business that have been transferred under Nebraska law are: the ability and right of the partner to act as an agent for the partnership;a
the liability of the newly-admitted partner for all pre-existing
debts of the partnership;39 the right to demand a full accounting of

the partnership's business affairs;4 0 the duty to be bound by a partner's breach of trust;4 1 and any and all other specific rights and

duties that the partnership agreement may specify. These rights
and duties are in addition to the partner's rights in specific partnership property4 2 -rights which serve as the basis for the Service's asset valuation rule. A substantive argument may be that the
Service's myopic view, in applying the asset valuation rule, of the
rights a deceased partner possesses in his partnership interest at
death does not comport with economic or legal reality. If the situation is such that the entire bundle of rights which comprises the
partnership is transferred at death, the Service should, in accord
with the realities of the disposition, view the partnership as an entity and not as an aggregate of undivided interests in partnership
net assets.4 3 Viewed as an entity, the partnership could be treated,
in cases where it is appropriate, similar to an interest in a close
corporation. 44 The Bischoff45 and Brown 46 courts appear to have

recognized the validity of this approach in the estate tax valuation
setting.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See note 31 & accompanying text supra.
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-309 (Reissue 1976).
Id. § 67-317.
Id. § 67-322.
Id. § 67-314.
Id. § 67-324.
One court appeared to specifically apply the undivided interest analogy for
estate tax valuation in an estate that held a 25% capital interest in a real
estate partnership. McColgan v. Commissioner, 10 B.TJA. 958, 959 (1928). See
also note 18 supra.
44. "Once the fact of a partnership is established, the value of a partnership interest is determined in much the same manner as the value of closely held
stocks." Chalmers, Valuation of Assets, TAX MNGMT. (BNA) 132-2d, A-13
(1977).
45. "[A] minority interest in a limited partnership is sufficiently similar to a minority interest in a corporation.. . ." 69 T.C. 32, 49 (1977).
46. The court did not explicitly recognize the corporation analogy but did consider the features of a minority interest previously limited to the corporate
area in estate tax valuation theory. 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 377, 380 (1977).
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2. Gift Tax and the Asset Valuation Rule
The same argument which supports discounting the value of
the partnership in certain situations also applies in the context of
valuation for the gift tax. Depending upon the value of the agree47
ment, and the consequences of the substitution of a new partner,
a similar transfer of a bundle of rights in the partnership entity
may occur, thus similarly diminishing the validity of the asset valuation rule. The gift of an interest in a partnership entity4 8 which
continues its business operations presents a situation not unlike
where on the death of a partner, the enthat previously described,
49
tity does not dissolve.
While it is logically more consistent than the Service's asset
valuation rule, the entity or bundle of rights theory described
above has not gained great favor with the Service. But important
judicial inroads have been made,5 0 signaling a reconsideration, if
not yet a retreat, from the traditional Service position regarding
valuation of partnership interests.
I.

JUDICIAL INROADS INTO THE SERVICE'S ASSET
VALUATION RULE

A.

51
Estate of Bischoff v. Commissioner

Lest any unwarranted enthusiasm be created, the following discussion should be preceded by a caveat. In both Bischoff and
Brown there existed certain specific and distinctive features
which may restrict application of the discount principle to limited
partnership interests or to those partnership interests which have
similar characteristics, as described below. In any case, the Service can be expected to challenge application of the discount con47. NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-327(1) (Reissue 1976) provides:
(1). A conveyance by a partner of his interest in the partnership
does not of itself dissolve the partnership nor, as against the other
partners in the absence of agreement, entitle the assignee, during the
continuance of the partnership, to interfere in the management or
administration of the partnership business or affairs, or to require
any information or account of partnership transactions, or to inspect
the partnership books; but it merely entitles the assignee to receive,
in accordance with his contract, the profits to which the assigning
partner would otherwise be entitled.
Clearly, the statute provides that the partners can agree among themselves
to delineate the rights and duties of the incoming partner.
48. See § 11-A-1 of text supra.
49. This comment deals exclusively with the valuation of partnership interests.
Any concepts of completed gifts, or part-sale, part-gift with respect to estate
or gift tax valuation are beyond the scope of this comment.
50. See notes 16, 19-21 & accompanying text supra.
51. 69 T.C. 32 (1977).
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cept when it is applied to partnership interests in any ways
dissimilar to those described below.
Estate of Bischoffv. Commissioner involved the estate tax valuation of a number of partnership interests at the death of a husband and wife. 52 The relevant partnership interests were Bruno
and Bertha Bischoff's interests in B.B.W., a limited partnership
real estate holding company.53 The limited partnership interests
were owned by three families. Bruno held a ten percent interest in
B.B.W. at death, while Bertha held a fifteen percent interest in
assets
B.B.W. at death.5 4 The holding company had underlying
55
valued at $858,000 at the time of Bruno Bischoff's death.
Unfortunately, the court does not discuss the features of the
partnership agreement of B.B.W.5 6 The only facts relevant to valuation presented are the nature and value of the underlying assets.5 7 Clearly, the asset valuation rule was to some extent applied
in Bischoff.5 8 However, the taxpayer also argued that the Service's
expert erred when he failed to apply a discount of the asset valuation to arrive at a proper valuation for estate tax purposes. 59 The
taxpayer sought a twenty-five percent discount because the dece52. Id. at 34.
53. Id. at 38. The holding company owned property in New York City, along with
other minor investments and assets. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Considerable discussion as to the features of the other partnership interests
being valued was included by the court, but since their value had been set by
a valid buy-sell agreement, that is not relevant to the valuation of B.B.W. See
id. at 35-36. It is not clear from the court's discussion whether the B.B.W.
partnership had the same restrictions on marketability as the other multifamily partnerships being valued. Among those restrictions were: (1) an absolute prohibition upon inter vivos transfers of partnership interests, (2) redemption of partnership interests only by the partnership, and (3) a
provision for a mandatory buy-out of the partner's interest upon death at a
price which represented the affected partner's capital account with adjustments reflecting partnership income and withdrawals. Id. at 36. For a comparison of how restrictions on transferability might affect a discounted
valuation of close corporation stock, see § IV-C of text infra.
57. 69 T.C. at 38.
58. In many cases of discount application, a key question is "To what figure
should the discount be applied?" Here, the underlying asset valuation appears to be the figure which is discounted. In the corporate setting, numerous other value theories are employed to arrive at a value of the business
entity to which an appropriate discount can be applied. See generally Jensen, supra note 7; Martin & Sanford, Applying FairMarket Value Appraisal
Techniques to Closely Held PreferredStock, 56 TAxEs 108 (1976) (a statistical
analysis of stock yield); Comment, supra note 7, at 739-41. As indicated by
Bischoff, any burial of the asset valuation rule would be premature.
59. 69 T.C. at 48.

746
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dent's interest represented only a minority interest, 60 while the
Service argued that no discount should be applied because B.B.W.
was "'similar to a real estate syndicate whose fractional interests
are traded at investment value.' "61
In Bischoff, the decedent could not, unless the agreement provided otherwise, compel dissolution or liquidation. Moreover, he
had no voice in management or control over investment policies or
partnership distribution, and possessed only a limited right to require a return of his contribution. 62 On the basis of the agreement,
the court granted a fifteen percent minority interest discount factor in arriving at fair market value for estate tax purposes. 63 The
court did not further explain its holding, except to draw an analogy
between this type of partnership interest and similar types of corporate interests:
In view of the existence of such restrictions on a limited partnership
interest, we conclude that a minority interest in a partnership is sufficiently similar to a minority interest in a corporation to require the application, in otherwise appropriate cases, of a minority 6 4discount factor in
determining the fair market value of such an interest.

The Bischoff court has impliedly given its permission to draw
the analogy between close corporate interests, which have traditionaliy merited discounted valuation, and limited partnership interests if those interests possess similar characteristics. Before
considering the implications of the close corporate analogy, one
further exploration of the judicial inroads into the asset valuation
rule is warranted.
B.

65
Estate of Go/die Brown v. Commissioner

The partnership subject to valuation in Brown held as its sole
assets several contiguous and noncontiguous parcels of undeveloped real estate near Scottsdale, Arizona. 66 Some of the parcels
had residential development possibilities but considerable expense and lead time would have been required before they could
be made suitable for tract use.6 7 There, as in Bischoff, the court
60.
61.
62.
63.

64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 49 (citation omitted).
Most of these rights were founded on New York State partnership law. Id.
Id. at 49-50. This court did what one commentator suggests the Tax Court has
been doing for years in close corporate valuation discount cases: arbitrated
between the taxpayer's and the Service's suggested discounts. Jensen, supra
note 7, at 240.
69 T.C. at 49.
46 T.C.M. (P-H) 377 (1977).
Id.
Id. at 380. The court considered the terrain features, lack of water and separation of the parcels in valuing and allowing a 10% discount of the value of
the land. Id. at 379, 380.
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747

looked to the underlying value of the partnership assets in arriving
at an estate tax valuation of the decedent's partnership interest.68
Although the partnership in Brown was general and not limited, at least in form, the nature of the relationship between the
parties to the partnership agreement may be analyzed in such a
way that in effect, the rights of the decedent partner at her death
were so limited that the partnership resembled a limited, not a
general, partnership. The court clearly considered this relationship in valuing the decedent's partnership interest.69 The other
partner was not only a wealthy and influential businessman whose
position placed a minority partner at a distinct disadvantage,7 0 he
also was executor of the estate of the previous holder of Goldie
Brown's one-quarter interest in the partnership and possessed the
contractual power of management of the partnership-a power
which was not to expire for a number of years. 71 It is readily apparent that although the partnership was general on paper, Goldie
Brown's interest was limited by virtue of the relationship between
the partners in a manner not unlike a formal limited partnership
similar to the interest discussed in Bischoff.7 2 The court, rejecting
the pure asset valuation rule, allowed a discount off the value of
the real estate, as the decedent held only a minority interest in the
partnership.
Both appraisers' reports agree that a discount of at least 10 percent on
a one-quarter minority interest in the DC Ranch partnership should be
made to account for the disadvantages of a minority status .... We see no
reason to think that [the other partner], though amenable to partitioning,
would not vigorously pursue his own interests to the fullest in any litigation to partition the property.73

Under the pure asset valuation method,7 4 the rights in the partnership entity which a decedent did or did not possess at death
would be largely irrelevant. But in Brown, the court considered
the legal status of a minority partner less desirable than that of a
partner with a majority interest, warranting a discount of ten percent. The argument that when the courts value partnership interests, the entity and its concurrent bundle of rights should be
considered in addition to the underlying value of the partnership
68. Id. at 379. The asset valuation rule appears entrenched in the judicial formulation of partnership valuation theory for estate tax purposes.
69. The court's interpretation of this relationship is rather cryptic but it is nonetheless clear by inference that the court felt these to be important factors.
See id.
70. Id. The other partner, Kemper Marley, was a man of apparently great wealth
and influence in the Phoenix area.
71. Id.
72. See § rn-A of text supra.
73. 46 T.C.M. (P-H) at 381 n.3.
74. See § H-A of text supra.
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assets 75 gained credence with the Brown decision. Brown and
Bischoff76 provide a basis for drawing an analogy between the valuation of corporate interests and of partnership interests.
C.

The Close Corporation Analogy

If certain partnership interests possessing features similar to
those described in the cases discussed above should be valued in
the same manner as interests in closely-held corporations, then
logically, some of the discounted valuation concepts of the close
corporation ought to apply to those partnership interests. 77 Depending, of course, upon the nature of the rights as defined by local
law and the partnership agreement, the same characteristics of minority interest,7 8 lack of marketability, 79 restrictions on transferability8 o and loss of key man8 l discount factors which have a
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
69 T.C. at 49.
See § IV of text infra.
A minority interest can be defined in terms of a less than 50% interest, or an
interest lacking sufficient control to force dissolution of the corporation. In
Nebraska, a two-thirds vote is required for voluntary dissolution. NEB. REV.
STAT. § 21-2083(3). Also, it takes a two-thirds vote to amend the articles of
incorporation. Id. § 21-2057(3). Most of the commentators view a minority
interest sufficiently minor to permit discounting as one which lacks control of
the business or management of the corporation. See Comment, supra note 7,
at 733-34. But the courts appear reluctant to allow a discount for an interest
which possesses in excess of 50% voting control. Cf. Nesta Obermer v.
United States, 238 F. Supp. 29, 36 (1964) (allowing a 33%,% discount from a
50% interest in a close corporation where state law required a two-thirds vote
to dissolve). See also Drybrough v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Ky.
1962) (defining minority interest as an interest which could not by itself force
liquidation). For the purposes of this comment, a minority interest will be
defined as one which, under the local law of the state, cannot control the organic management decisions, such as liquidation, dissolution or merger, and
cannot force the majority interest to declare dividends.
79. Some courts confuse the discount concept of authority interest with that of
lack of marketability. Estate of Gregg Maxcy v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M.
(CCH) 783 (1964) (allowing a 15% discount for nonmarketability based on the
undesirability of a minority interest); Worthen v. United States, 192 F. Supp.
727 (D. Mass. 1961) (allowing an 11% discount for minority interest and lack
of marketability, while not distinguishing the terms). Some commentators
have likewise missed the distinction. See Moroney, supra note 9, at 144. It is
easy to fail to make the distinction, because the concept of minority interest
does affect marketability. But the marketability discount concerns itself exclusively with the lack of a ready buyer for the interest for whatever reasons,
e.g., lack of a guaranteed return in the form of dividends, lack of ability to
make management decisions in a corporation run by a single family, and lack
of an ability to realize capital gain on the investment. See also Rev. Rul. 59-60,
1959-1 C.B. 237, 239. For a discussion of the special features that make close
corporation stock less marketable, warranting a discount, see id. See also
§ IV-B of text infra.
80. The restrictions on transferability discounts relate directly to the marketabil-
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substantial basis in the corporate area, 82 could logically be applied
in the partnership valuation area.
The immediate hurdle to the acceptance of the corporate analogy and the specific discounts it allows in the partnership valuation area is the Service's continued insistence on the use of the
asset valuation rule. While the Service continues to argue for an
aggregate or asset valuation approach in estate and gift tax valuation, the reality of the situation and the developing judicial acceptance of an entity approach appear to place the practitioner on
83
semi-solid ground if he takes a discount from the net asset value
of a partnership interest based upon one of the previously enumerated corporate discount factors. The following discussion will com84
pare and analyze each of the four basic discount factors,
examining their operation in the close corporate setting, and developing a theory for their application to the valuation of limited and
general partnership interests. It will be suggested that the asset
valuation rule has limited applicability in partnership valuation,
and, accordingly, its use should be curtailed significantly in favor
of an entity or bundle of rights approach similar to that presently
applied by the Service to close corporate interests.

81.

82.

83.
84.

ity discount factor. If an interest is encumbered with mandatory buy-sell or
first refusal rights, its marketability may diminish as potential buyers view
the restrictions as limitations on their ability to realize capital gain. These
factors are the least important discount factors of the four discussed herein.
If a business is such that the loss of the managing executive would seriously
depreciate earning power of the business, a key man discount may legitimately be applied upon the death or retirement of that individual. Maher,
Application of Key Man Discounts in the Valuation of Closely-Held Businesses, 55 TAXES 377, 378-79 (1977). The application of this discount concept
should be applied only in those cases where the success or failure of the business depends largely on the ability and guidance of a key man. See id.
See generally Central Trust Co. v. United States, 305 F.2d 393 (Ct. Cl. 1962);
Bader v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Ill. 1959); Estate of Gregg
Maxcy, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 783 (1969); Estate of Tully v. United States, 41
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) (Ct. Cl. 1978); Bardahl v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH)
841 (1965); Worthen v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 727 (D. Mass. 1961); Estate
of Orville B. Littick v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 181 (1958).
The question of "discount from what?" is answered in Moroney, supra note 9,
at 144-46.
The discount factors are minority interest, lack of marketability, restrictions
on transferability and loss of key man. See notes 77-82 supra.
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IV. DISCOUNT CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTNERSHIPS
AND THE CLOSE CORPORATION ANALOGY
A.

Minority Interest Discounts
1. Close Corporations

A close corporation has limited value unless there is inherent in
that corporation some guarantee to the interest holder of an income return or of future capital gain that has a potential of being
realized.8 5 Aside from the by-laws, the shareholders' rights under
local law generally determine the nature of the rights the minority
interest holder possesses.
a.

Rights Under Local Law

A minority interest 86 in a close corporation in Nebraska entails
a right to compel the directors to act within the limits of fiduciary
duty to any shareholder. 87 Beyond that, a minority shareholder
has little effective control over the dividend policy of the corporation8 8 or over dissolution or liquidation8 9 of the corporation. Thus,
the rights that could make the minority interest valuable are beyond the minority shareholder's control, excluding the possibility
of a minority interest alliance with other shareholders. A minority
interest, while not worthless, is worth considerably less than its
fair market value 9 0 because a purchaser 91 of the interest would not
be willing to pay fair market value for an interest that conceivably
would produce no income or capital gain. It should be clear that a
85. See Comment, supra note 7, at 734.
86. For the purposes of this comment, a minority interest has been defined as
one that cannot force dissolution. See note 78 supra. For a treatment of different concepts of minority interests, see Butala, Valuation of Closely Held
Corporations,7 U. MiAmx EsT. PLAN. INST. 73.1400 (1973). Butala sets out
four major types of control: (1) majority or greater than 50% control; (2) liquidating or dissolution control; (3) "effective" control-control sufficient because the other shareholders are numerous, scattered or passive in their
attitudes; and (4) a balance of control-owning a block of stock which adverse factions seek to achieve their control. Id. 73.1406.
87. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2047 (Reissue 1976).
88. See id. § 21-2043.
89. See id. § 21-2083.
90. Just how much less is still the subject of considerable debate. At least one
commentator has argued that for a minority interest, a 75 to 90% discount is
not unreasonable. Moroney, supra note 9, at 156.
91. Herein lies the cause of the confusion between minority interest discounts
and marketability discounts. The Service values interests under the willing
buyer-willing seller concept. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1 (b) (1958). For a full discussion of this problem, see § IV-B-1-a of text infra. See also Krahmer &
Henderer, Valuation of Shares of Closely Held Corporations, TAX MNGMT.
(BNA) 221, A-52 (1969).
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minority interest in a partnership may possess these same disadvantages, thus warranting application of the discount factor to the
minority interest in a partnership.
2. General PartnershipInterests
Though Nebraska law places limitations on a minority interest
in a general partnership, there are no provisions comparable to
those pertaining to close corporations which limit a partner's right
to income or dissolution.92 Nebraska law does provide that any difference among the partners as to ordinary matters of the partnership business can be decided by majority vote.93 Also, a single
partner may cause the partnership to be dissolved,94 entitling him
to his proportionate share in the partnership assets, 95 absent a
partnership agreement to the contrary. Furthermore, an individual general partner has an equal voice in the management of the
partnership regardless of the percentage of the interest he possesses.9 6 Thus, under a purely legal analysis, it appears that the
value of the minority interest rights in a corporation and a partnership are not sufficiently similar to merit similar discount treatment.
Partnership law, however, provides that since the value of a
partnership agreement is inherently contractual, the partners may
delimit and define their rights and duties as they so choose. An
agreement which places limitations on minority rights to dissolve
the partnership should be afforded the same respect as a similar
corporate by-law. 97 Since the application of a discount in this context depends largely upon the nature and effect of the partnership
agreement, no generalizations should be made at this juncture.
Suffice it to say that the closer the partnership agreement comes to
limiting a partner's rights in a manner similar to the way local law
limits a minority shareholder's rights, the more effective the argument for application of a discount becomes.
92. The general rule is that a partner must share equally in the profits and losses
of a partnership. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-318(a) (Reissue 1976).
93. Id. § 67-318(h).
94. Id. § 67-331(1) (b).
95. See id. §§ 67-338(1), 67-340(d).
96. UPA § 18(e) reads: "All partners have equal rights in the management and
conduct of the partnership business."
97. See, Bischoff, 69 T.C. 32; and Brown, 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 46. Although both courts
allowed discounts for partnership interests specifically because of their minority status, only the Brown court considered the difficulties of dissolution.
46 T.C.M. (P-H) at 381 n.3. The Bischoffcourt was dealing with a limited partnership. See § IV-A-3 of text infra.
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3. Limited PartnershipInterests
The concept of a minority interest in a limited partnership is
somewhat anomalous. A limited partner generally does not possess management powers in any case, 98 so whether the interest is
a minority interest appears to make little difference. A limited
partner's interest in personal property 99 which may be freely assigned' 0 0 basically entitles him to a return on his capital interest
while protecting him from the general liability of the partnership
capital interest in the
entity.' 0 ' He has a right to his proportionate
102
partnership net assets upon dissolution.
In Bischoff, the court allowed a minority interest discount specifically because of the limitations local law placed on the limited
partner. 03 The basis for this discounting appears solid, and Bischoff may be cited as compelling authority in the limited partnership
minority interest valuation cases. Since Brown may also be analyzed as a limited partnership valuation case, it too may be cited as
authority for the allowance of a discount for a minority interest in
a limited partnership.
B.

Lack of Marketability Discounts
1.

Close Corporations

Much of the above discussion on rights under Nebraska law is
also applicable to the close corporation. Where the local law or the
entity agreement limits the interest holder's rights, there is a concurrent reflection on marketability. The practitioner should be
aware of this overlap in characterization. 0 4 But the marketability
discount is distinct from the minority interest discount in that it
deals primarily with the quality of the entity from an economic
standpoint. 0 5 Generally, the starting points in the application of a
98. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-210 (1978 Cum. Supp.). See generally Comment,
supra note 1.
99. NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-218 (Reissue 1976).

100. Id. § 67-219(1) (1978 Cum. Supp.).
101. Id. § 67-210(2) (1978 Cum. Supp.). See id. §§ 67-215, 67-216 (Reissue 1976).
102. Id. § 67-223 (Reissue 1976).
103. In so doing, the court stated:
[U]nless provided otherwise in the partnership agreement or by
reason of a court decree, a limited partner cannot compel dissolution
A limited partner
and liquidation of a limited partnership ....
merely has the right to require a return of his contribution to the
limited partnership.... Moreover, a limited partner generally has
no voice in the management of the partnership and cannot control
investment policies or partnership distribution.
69 T.C. at 49 (citations omitted).
104. See notes 85-97 & accompanying text supra.
105. See Moroney, Why 25% Discount for Nonmarketability in One Valuation,
100% in Another?, 55 TAXES 316, 318 (1977). Central Trust Co. v. United
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marketability discount are Treasury Regulation § 20.2031-1(b) and
Revenue Ruling 59-60.
a.

The Hypothetical Sale: Section 20.2031-1(b) and Revenue
Ruling 59-60

The Service has taken the view that fair market value is "the
price at which the property would change hands between a willing
buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to
buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant
facts."' 0 6 The problem with this hypothetical sale method in the
close corporation context is apparent. There generally is no ready
market for interests, minority or otherwise, in close corporations. 0 7 The Service recognized this problem when it issued Revenue Ruling 59-60. There, the Service adopted a distinct approach
for dealing with valuation of closely held stock where no ready
market existed. 0 8 The following factors were to be considered in
arriving at a determination of fair market value:
(a) The nature of the business and the history of the enterprise from its
inception.
(b) The economic outlook in general and the condition and outlook of the
specific industry in particular.
(c) The book value of the stock and the financial condition of the business.
(d) The earning capacity of the company.
(e) The dividend-paying capacity.
(f) Whether or not the enterprise has goodwill or other intangible value.
(g) Sales of the stock and the size of the block of stock to be valued. 1 0 9

These are factors which are to be considered when valuing the
corporate entity. In this revenue ruling, the Service also accepted
the concept of a discount for a lack of marketability. The lack of
marketability may result from the negative impact any or all of the
factors have on the economic condition of the business, including
the additional handicaps that a minority interest would impose on
the shareholder. If the courts begin to accept the entity or bundle
of rights concept with respect to partnership valuation, as it ap-

106.
107.

108.
109.

States, 305 F.2d at 405-08; Worthen v. United States, 192 F. Supp. at 730; Estate
of Gregg Maxcy, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) at 792-93.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1958).
Some commentators have suggested that an actual sales analysis should be
applied, and have compared the discounts for sales of "restricted letter stock"
of public corporations with close corporate interests. Discounts as high as
70% have been suggested under this method. See Coolidge, Fixing Value of
Minority Interest in a Business, Actual Sales Suggest Discount as High as
70%, 2 EST. PLAN. 138 (1975); Trout, Estimation of the Discount Associated
With the Transfer of Restricted Securities,55 TAxEs 381 (1977).
"When a stock is closely held ... some other measure [than comparison of
sales of similar stock] of value must be used." Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237,
238.
Id. at 238-39.
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pears they are, 110 then these factors justifiably could be applied to
the partnership interest to ascertain its marketability or lack
thereof.
2. PartnershipInterests and the Marketability Discount
In addition to a consideration of the factors cited above, a partnership may possess special features which limit its marketability.
In the case in which the partner's only interest in the partnership
is his right to share in the profits and surplus of the partnership
"as is the case where the partner is the assignee of the partnership
interest,""' and thus has no voice in the management of the business, 112 there is an inherent limitation on the marketability of the
interest. Few buyers would be willing to purchase an interest in
an ongoing partnership if they knew that they might have no voice
in management or control of the business.
Although a full discussion of the application of discount principles to "frozen" partnership interests is beyond the scope of this
comment, a short discussion of the lack of marketability discount
with respect to these interests is appropriate. A "frozen" partnership interest is one that will have a fixed liquidation value and
maintain a preferred income distribution position. 113 In many respects, it resembles the preferred stock in a corporate setting. The
rationale behind freezing the interest is to prevent the further appreciation in value of that interest, thus in effect limiting valuation
for estate tax purposes. The "frozen" partnership units may or
may not carry the incidents of control and management of the partnership. 1 14 The rights that might be attached to the frozen units
will depend entirely upon the client's needs and the partnership
agreement. A discussion of potential discount features therefore
necessarily requires a caveat: the partnership agreement should
be the starting place in a consideration of features meriting a discount.
a.

Lack of Marketability

It should be clear that a partnership interest which possesses a
relatively low rate of return and no possibility of sharing in any
future appreciation of the entity will have a minimal market at
best. In the corporate area, a discount was allowed for corporate
110. See notes 54-66 & accompanying text supra.
111. NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-327(1) (Reissue 1976).
112. See id. See also Korner, Issues and Problems in Valuing Closely Held Business Interestsfor Estate Tax Purposes, Especially PartnershipInterests, 30
N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAx. 185, 204-06 (1977).
113. Abbin, supra note 13, 1 1801.1.
114. Comment, supra note 1, at 62.
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preferred stock with a yield below the market rate. 115 Although
there is no authority for this in the partnership area, if the features
of the frozen units sufficiently resemble the preferred stock which
was given a discount, there does not appear to be any justification
for not according the partnership interest similar treatment.
It should be noted, however, that the features of priority in income and capital distributions that may be part of the frozen
units 116 would enhance their marketability. Perhaps one method
to lessen the likelihood of creating a bonus instead of a discount
feature would be to limit the income payments guarantee to the
extent available from current income. The condition of the business would become of more importance in the valuation of these
frozen units-which is the basic approach of Revenue Ruling 5960.1"
The area of frozen partnerships is still developing and the practitioner should be aware of the possible pitfalls awaiting." 8 But if
the freezing of asset valuation is sought, coupled with the possibility of a discount for lack of marketability, the potential estate tax
savings under this structure are substantial and may well be worth
the risk.
Aside from the frozen partnership area, the Service may be expected to continue to assert that a partner gets the proportionate
share of the underlying net assets and that the marketability factors should not be applied." 9 The same reasoning applicable to
close corporate interests and the marketability discount should be
applied to general and limited partnership interests which possess
similar characteristics of non-marketability. The Bischoff court
justihas impliedly accepted that proposition, 2 0 and the economic
2
fication for adopting the entity approach is compelling.' '
115. See Rev. Rul. 74-269, 1974-1 C.B. 87.
116. Abbin, supra note 13, T 1802.1.
117. See § IV-B-i-a of text supra. The planner must, however, be aware that the
formula should not be structured so as to disqualify the payment from constituting a deductible guaranteed payment. I.R.C. § 707(c).
118. Some Service examiners have indicated that the "frozen partnership" vehicle
will not be recognized for what it is, and will bring about automatic audit and
challenge by the Service. Interview with Mike Eutelson, IRS Estate Tax Examiner, Omaha, Nebraska (Nov. 28, 1979).
119. See Fiorito v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 440,443,447 (1959) (adopting asset valuation of a partnership interest); Rev. Rul. 68-154, 1968-1 C.B. 395.
120. 69 T.C. at 49-50.
121. "The entity approach... predominates in the treatment of transfers of partnership interests as transfers of interests in a separate entity rather than in
the assets of the partnership." 1 MCIEE, supra note 15, 1 1.02[2]. See I.R.C.
§§ 741, 742, 743(a). There appears to be no compelling reason to treat transfers at death or by gift any different for valuation purposes than the entity
approach adopted by the Code in these instances.
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Restrictions on Transferability

A discourse on the types of value-limiting devices available to
the owners of corporate and partnership interests is beyond the
scope of this comment. 122 Rights of first refusal and valid buy-sell
agreements may be employed in either a corporate or a partnership valuation case to set that valuation for estate or gift tax purposes. 23 Consequently, once the valuation is set by either type of
value-limiting device, the discounts for restrictions on transferability are not applicable.
Nevertheless, valid restrictions on transferability of a partnership or corporate interest may have an effect on the marketability
of that interest. 24 If a prospective seller must wait until his offer
has first been refused by those persons to whom he is required to
offer the interest, there is justification for allowing a discount to
reflect a possible deterioration in the market value of those assets
during the specified non-sale period. 125 There appears to be substantial authority for allowing a discounted valuation of a partnership interest when first refusal rights or a valid buy-sell agreement
exists sufficient to depress the marketability of the interest.
D.

Loss of Key Man Discounts

The nature of a close corporation or a partnership is generally
such that the death or retirement of key management personnel
may substantially affect the success of the business. 12 6 The Service has explicitly recognized this possibility. 27 In the case of partnerships, there is as much justification for the allowance of a
122. For treatments of this subject, see generally Abrams, Tax PlanningforAgreements Disposingof a Shareholder'sClosely Held Stock at Death, 27 J. Mo. B.
445 (1971); Castleman, The Use of RestrictiveAgreements in Estate Tax Valuation of Farmlandsand Other Properties,64 Ky. L.J. 785 (1976); Ludtke, Planning for Family Corporate Control, 58 NEB. L. REV. 644 (1979); Stechel,
Restrictive Buy-Sell Agreements Can Limit Estate Tax Value of a Business
Interest, 44 J. TAx. 360 (1976).
123. See Estate of Orville B. Littick, 31 T.C. 181 (1958) (upholding corporate valuation as determined in buy-sell agreement); Brodrick v. Gore, 224 F.2d 892
(10th Cir. 1955) (upholding validity of valuation set in partnership buy-sell
agreement). Cf. United States v. Land, 62-1 U.S.T.C. 84,576 (5th Cir. 1962) (denying valuation as set in partnership buy-sell agreement).
124. See Stechel, supra note 122, at 365.
125. Estate of Cotchett, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 138, 142 (1974). See Comment, supra
note 7, at 735-36.
126. See Maher, supra note 81, at 377.
127.
The loss of the manager of a so-called one-man business may have a
depressing effect upon the value of the stock of such business, particularly if there is a lack of trained personnel capable of succeeding to
the management of the enterprise. In valuing the stock of this type
of business ... the effect of the loss of the manager on the future
expectancy of the business, and the absence of management-succes-
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discount when key management personnel leave the business as
in the corporate setting. The partnership entity is no less affected
by reason of the availability of other partners in management capacities, if the loss of the key man truly represents a potential 12loss
8
of future earnings, goodwill or creditworthiness of the entity.
In the limited partnership entity, the loss of the general partner
may have substantial adverse effects, especially if the success of
the partnership depended on the management skills and guidance
of that general partner. It is not clear, however, whether the courts
will allow substantial discounts in this type of case. The Service is
likely to assert that the asset valuation rule and local law combine
to limit the valuation of the interest to the partner's proportionate
share of net assets. 129 This author knows of no reported case
which explicitly grants a discount in the type of case mentioned
above.
The application of corporate discount principles to the partnership entity is breaking new ground. While the arguments may appear economically and legally sound, the practitioner cannot, at
this juncture, rely on the wisdom of the courts to grant the beneficial discounts sought. Careful drafting of partnership agreements
may help provide a sound factual basis for some of the discounts.
VI.

CONCLUSION

From an economic and realistic viewpoint, the Service is on
loose and shifting sands if it continues to insist on the application
of the asset valuation rule as the sole method in valuing partnership entities for estate and gift tax purposes. A much sounder approach would be to draw from the corporate area and use the longrecognized valuation concepts in arriving at the value of the partnership entity. Once this step toward the "bundle of rights" approach is taken, those discount concepts should naturally be
applied where the situation so allows. Until that occurs, the practitioner will have to rely on the corporate analogy and the sparse
judicial precedents when arguing the case for valuation discounts
of partnership interests.
Kurt A. Hohenstein, '80

sion potentialities are pertinent factors to be taken into considera-

tion.
Rev. RuL 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 239.
128. See Maher, supra note 81, at 378. This commentator suggests a straight 10%
discount where it is applicable. Id. at 379-80.
129. See § II of text supra.

